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Accounting for goodwill: an examination of
factors influencing management preferences
Pelham Gore, Fauziah M. Taib and Paul A. Taylor*
Abstract—This paper investigates factors that influenced the position of managements of UK-listed companies in
the heated debate that surrrounded proposals for a new standard on goodwill accounting, i.e. the factors influencing
whether managements preferred immediate write-off or capitalisation-based approaches. The factors investigated
are derived from contracting cost theory, and include those associated with debt covenant restrictions and profit-
based management schemes. They also include non-agency contracting costs. A key feature of the design is that,
compared to prior research, we specify more rigorously circumstances where such contracting cost effects are, or
are not, likely to be binding. In addition, the paper investigates the effects on management preferences of their
beliefs about revisions in market perceptions of their companies resulting from changes in goodwill accounting.
Our results support certain contracting cost-based hypotheses, but they also indicate that management beliefs about
changes in market perceptions of their companies constitute a strong influence on their preferences.
1. Introduction
This paper reports the results of an investigation
of factors that influenced the positions taken by
managements of UK-listed companies during the
heated debate surrounding proposals for a new
standard on goodwill accounting. This was at a
time when the UK Accounting Standards Board
(ASB) had not decided upon an appropriate
method and was canvassing various constituencies,
including managements, on how it should proceed.
One set of factors examined here to explain why
managements favoured the mandating by the ASB
of capitalisation or immediate write-off based ap-
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proaches is based on contracting cost theory. This
includes agency costs associated with debt cove-
nants and management compensation schemes and
other, non-agency, costs. Also examined are
information effects deriving from managements'
beliefs about the impact goodwill accounting
would have on market perceptions of their
companies.
Our paper adds to prior UK work on this issue
by gathering information that is not publicly avail-
able about the nature of the bond covenants and
management compensation schemes of large UK
listed companies. Our results indicate that certain
contracting cost factors, such as binding gearing-
based debt covenant restrictions and applicable
profit-based management compensation plans, do
affect management preferences. They also show
that such preferences are strongly affected by
management beliefs about market perceptions.
Our identification of such factors can assist pol-
icymakers in understanding what may infiuence
management positions during future debates over
other reporting standards.
The next section of the paper examines the
development of goodwill accounting in the UK.
Related studies are then reviewed and hypotheses
developed. After describing the data and the var-
iables used to operationalise hypothesis testing, we
explain the model used. Our results and related
sensitivity analyses are then discussed. Finally, a
summary and conclusions are presented and im-
plications for standard-setters discussed.
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2. The UK debate on goodwill
Accounting for goodwill has long been controver-
sial in the UK. There is evidence that, in the ab-
sence of regulation, preparers have been divided
over which approach to use. The Survey of Pub-
lished Accounts 1979 (Skerratt, 1980:158) shows
that in 1976/77 38% of companies disclosing a
goodwill accounting policy carried goodwill at
original cost, 42% used immediate write-off to re-
serves and 20% capitalised and amortised it. Sub-
sequently, the Companies Act 1981 prohibited the
first of these methods. The Accounting Standards
Committee's (ASC) SSAP 22 Accounting for Good-
will (ASC, 1984) was unusual in allowing alterna-
tive treatments: it stated that goodwill should nor-
mally be dealt with by immediate write-off direct
to reserves but also permitted capitalisation and
amortisation. However, the vast majority of UK
companies chose immediate write-off, with the re-
sult that their reported profit figures were not
adversely affected by amortisation of purchased
goodwill, but their gearing (leverage) ratios were
severely increased due to depletion of accounting
equity. Weetman and Gray (1991) found that, for
a sample of 41 UK companies in 1986, profits un-
der UK GAAP were 10.2% higher than under US
GAAP because of such goodwill accounting
differences.
The often dramatic balance sheet effects of im-
mediate write-off elicited considerable attention.
Fierce debate arose over the capitalisation of in-
tangibles such as brand names so as to ameliorate
such adverse gearing effects (Barwise et al, 1989),
and the possible concomitant incentives to revalue
(upwards) fixed assets were also examined (Lin
and Peasnell, forthcoming). Considerable argu-
ment was also generated over how goodwill itself
should be accounted for (see, for example, Arnold
et al; 1992). In particular, concerns were aired that
the SSAP 22 position was at variance with the
international norm of capitalisation and amortis-
ation. Arguments were advanced for capitalisa-
tion, predicated, for example, on the desirability
of international harmonisation and concerns that
immediate write-off against reserves might give
British companies an advantage in making inter-
national take-over bids (Choi and Lee, 1991; ASB,
1997). The fact that UK managements had discre-
tion in choosing their companies' goodwill ac-
counting treatment was also a cause for great
concern.
Proposals by the ASC (Exposure Drafts 47 and
52: ASC, 1990a, 1990b) to impose capitahsation
and amortisation of goodwill and other intangibles
met with overwhelming opposition: 93% of cor-
porate submissions and 73% of all submissions
were against the goodwill proposals (ASB,
1993:12). In December 1993, the ASB, admitting
it could not achieve agreement among its board
members on this topic, issued a Discussion Paper
(DP) Goodwill and Other Intangibles (ASB, 1993),
outlining six alternatives for accounting for good-
will, three involving capitalisation and amortisa-
tion, and three immediate write-off.' The DP
indicated that the ASB wished to adopt a single
approach to goodwill accounting.
As as result of responses to the DP, the ASB
issued a Working Paper (WP), Goodwill and Intan-
gible Assets (ASB, 1995). This generally supported
capitalisation and predetermined life amortisation,
with impairment tests for goodwill or intangibles
'believed to have indefinitely long lives'. The ASB
made a 'tentative conclusion' that goodwill should
be shown as an asset, but still allowed the poss-
ibility that it would be shown as a separately dis-
closed deduction from reserves. After public hear-
ings in September 1995, the ASB issued FRED 12
in June 1996 and the FRS 10 in December 1997
(ASB, 1996, 1997). Both required capitalisation of
goodwill and other intangibles, with amortisation
over their useful economic lives where these are
regarded as of limited duration. These documents,
like the WP, included a rebuttable presumption
that such lives will not exceed 20 years. However,
where goodwill or intangibles are regarded as hav-
ing an indefinite life and are capable of continued
measurement, they are not to be amortised, but are
to be written down only if necessary, using annual
impairment tests as a way of recognising the loss
of value.
This paper focuses specifically on the goodwill
accounting aspects of the debate and, in particular,
on the period between the ASB's 1993 Discussion
Paper and its 1995 Working Paper proposals, a
time of uncertainty over which course of action the
ASB would take. The inclusion by the ASB in the
DP of both immediate write-off and capitalisation
options provides the opportunity to study the pref-
erences of UK-listed companies for the accounting
treatment to be adopted in the future standard and
also the factors that were driving their preferences.
3. Development of hypotheses
Studies examining the factors influencing account-
ing choice have been difficult to carry out in the
UK due to limitations on data availability. Our
work builds on earlier UK studies that examined
contracting and other explanations for accounting
choice decisions. Mather and Peasnell (1991), for
example, studied the decision in 1988 by major
'The six alternatives were:
i. capitalisation with predetermined life amortisation,
ii. capitalisation subject only to impairment tests,
iii. a combination of capitalisation approaches i and ii.
iv. immediate write-off direct to unspecified reserves.
V. immediate write-off to a separate reserve,
vi. combination of immediate write-off to reserves with im-
pairment tests.
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British companies to capitalise brands. They found
that capitalisation was associated with high lever-
age and the implications of Stock Exchange Class
1 transactions (discussed later). Grinyer et al.
(1991) examined factors that influenced the pro-
portion of a company's purchase price assigned to
net tangible assets and therefore to goodwill. They
found that a contracting cost-related variable, the
post-acquisition gearing ratio, influenced this de-
cision. However, such British studies have been
hampered by the lack of publicly available
information about many of the variables widely
assumed to drive accounting choices, e.g. company
debt covenant restrictions and proflt-based
management compensation plans. To overcome
this problem we collect data by survey and use
them in conjunction with published flnancial data.
Other UK studies have examined the form of
restrictions in UK debt covenants, relevant here in
our measurement of contracting cost variables.
Citron (1992a) examined 25 UK bank loan con-
tracts and found that the great majority were
based on rolling (extant) GAAP, and all were
based on consolidated amounts. Non-GAAP ap-
proaches were adopted in net worth covenant re-
strictions relating to some intangibles and to good-
will, but apparently not in the gearing- or
proflt-based restrictions that we use in our study.
Earlier, Citron (1992b) had found by survey that
bankers claimed they would be understanding in
dealing with technical breaches caused by changes
in GAAP, and that costs imposed on borrowers
resulting from such breaches are therefore likely to
be smaller than for other breaches.
Citron (1995) found in 108 UK public debt is-
sues (over an earlier period than our study) that,
unlike US public debt agreements, UK account-
ing-based covenants are mainly afflrmative, i.e. ap-
plying at all times while the debt is outstanding.
He conjectured (p. 148) that such covenants po-
tentially influence managements' accounting policy
choices more than where covenants only become
operational at the time of specifled actions such as
raising new debt. Day and Taylor, in similarly or-
ientated research, interviewed 18 officials from fln-
ancial institutions (Day and Taylor, 1995), 44 cor-
porate treasurers from major UK companies (Day
and Taylor, 1996) and examined a sample of loan
agreements. They reported (Day and Taylor, 1994)
that gearing and interest cover, used in our paper,
were two of the main accounting variables used in
bank loan covenants in the UK. Studies, summar-
ised in Leuz et al. (1998), found that dividend
based covenants were not widely used in the UK,^
We now set out the hypotheses to be tested.
^Other non-accounting policy choice research on goodwill,
based on US data, has focussed on the relationship between
the amount of reported goodwill in that country and the mar-
ket capitalisation of equity. For example, Chauvin and Hir-
3.1. Contracting cost hypotheses
We use costly contracting theory to identify fac-
tors, which include both agency and non-agency
costs, expected to underlie management prefer-
ences for particular accounting treatments of
goodwill (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990: 134-5).
3.1.1. Agency contracting costs
The paper focuses on three primary agency re-
lationships discussed in the literature, between 1)
management and shareholders, 2) shareholders/
managers and debtholders, and 3) the company
and outside regulators ('political costs'), and
frames hypotheses in terms of the standard varia-
bles used to measure 'opportunistic' management
behaviour (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990: 138-
140).
Based on such a framework, we would predict
company preferences for goodwill accounting to
take the following forms:
•Where there are management compensation
schemes based on accounting proflts', influenced
by the effects of goodwill accounting, there will
be a preference for methods not impacting
adversely on reported proflt, i.e. immediate write-
off to reserves methods. We therefore predict a
negative association between capitalisation-based
approaches and the existence of such compensa-
tion plans.
•Where a company has debt covenant restrictions
based on balance sheet ratios such as gearing, we
hypothesise a positive association between capi-
talisation-based preferences and the presence of
such restrictions. However, if debt covenant re-
schey (1994), using a simultaneous equations approach, exam-
ined interrelationships between goodwill, net income and
market capitalisation. McCarthy and Schneider (1995) also
examined the relationship between equity market capitalisation
and goodwill, including income-based explanatory variables
within an Ohlson-type framework (Ohlson, 1995). They con-
cluded that, for US firms, the market does seem to treat
acounting goodwill as a value component. Jennings et al. (1996)
report a strong cross-sectional association between equity val-
ues and recorded goodwill balances for US firms, but only a
weak negative relationship between goodwill amortisation and
equity values. Barth and Clinch (1996) examine the effects of
international accounting differences and their effects on share
prices. Their US findings are consistent with the above studies
and they find that for IJK companies share prices seem to act
as if goodwill were an asset, but with a lower coefficient than
other assets.
' in our questionnaire we asked about the existence of ac-
counting profit-based management compensation plans and ac-
counting-hased debt covenant restrictions, in the full knowlege
that such contracts also contain a wide range of other non-
accounting indicators (e.g. see Smith and Warner, 1979 and
Citron, 1992b and 1995). We make the assumption that other
contracting provisions do not mask such first order effects in
our study. We also specifically adduced information about the
treatment of goodwill in such contracts. Unfortunately, as in
many other studies, we are not able to examine the upper and
lower bounds of management compensation contracts dis-
cussed by Healy (1985).
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strictions are based on income statement-based
ratios, companies will prefer methods that do not
reduce profits, i.e., immediate write-off to re-
serves methods. Thus we hypothesise a negative
association between capitalisation-based prefer-
ences and the presence of interest cover-based
restrictions.
•In politicially visible companies, we use size to
proxy for political costs (Watts and Zimmerman,
1990: 139) and hypothesise that capitalisation-
based approaches would be preferred by large
companies since they reduce reported profit com-
pared to immediate write-off ones (i.e., a positive
association between capitalisation-based ap-
proaches and size). Size variables are ambiguous
to interpret, and can be characterised as control
variables. We also employ a dummy variable in
our models to assess effects unique to utilities,
which are more heavily regulated; however, as
regulation is complex, we do not predict the
direction of this relationship.
We predict that company preferences would
only be affected where such accounting-based
management compensation contracts and debt
covenant restrictions are near contract limits
('binding') and based on accounting numbers cal-
culated using rolling GAAP; no effect is predicted
if they are based on UK GAAP 'fixed' at the time
the agreement was signed.
3.1.2. Non-agency contracting costs
These take many forms, for example transaction
costs (e.g. brokerage costs), renegotiation costs
and other differential costs. We examine two po-
tentially differential costs incurred by UK-incor-
porated listed companies: whether companies have
a US quote and whether they have had to consider
a (UK) Stock Exchange Class 1 transaction. Since
US GAAP requires capitalisation and amortisa-
tion, companies having a US quote already have
to produce accounts on this basis (or a reconcili-
ation between US GAAP and their accounts pro-
duced under UK GAAP) regardless of the method
that they choose for UK reporting purposes. If the
ASB required capitalisation, such companies
would incur fewer extra compliance costs than
companies not quoted in the US. We would thus
predict a positive association between preference
for capitahsation-based approaches and having a
US quote.
Listed companies incur transaction costs, such
as obtaining shareholder approval or preparing
and circulating certain prospectus-type informa-
tion, if they engage as bidders in take-over deals
classified by the Stock Exchange as Class 1 trans-
actions. In periods leading up to the study. Class
1 status was attributed to a take over deal if the
fair value of the assets being acquired (or disposed
of) exceeded the book value of the acquiring (dis-
posing) company by 15% or more (Yellow Book,
Section 6). Furthermore, the book value of the ac-
quiring company included goodwill as an asset
only if capitalisation was the accounting pohcy
used in its financial statements. We would thus
predict that companies planning takeover bids
which had to consider Class 1 transactions would
prefer capitalisation of goodwill so as to increase
their book value relative to the fair value of (prob-
ably less acquisitive) target companies and thus
minimise the chance of such transactions falling
within the relevant Class 1 criteria, i.e. a positive
association between a preference for capitalisation
and the fact that the company has needed to con-
sider Class 1 transactions in planning bids.
3.2. Information effect ('IE') hypotheses
As noted earlier, many of the concerns about
possible changes to goodwill accounting require-
ments in the practitioner-orientated accounting
literature seem to be directly related to balance
sheet and income statement impacts of goodwill
accounting (e.g. Pearce, 1994). T'o test such alter-
native explanations for company preferences, we
examine whether such preferences are infiuenced
by finance directors' beliefs about how analysts
will interpret any change in reported ratios and
profits, particularly if they have naive beliefs about
how analysts will react. For example, would com-
panies have a preference for the ASB to choose
capitalisation-based alternatives if they believed
that analysts would treat increased gearing as a
sign of increased riskiness? Also, would they prefer
immediate write-off methods if they believed that
reduced reported profits resulting from goodwill
amortisation would cause analysts to downgrade
their assessment of the company?
The existence of a strong relationship between
corporate management preferences and their be-
liefs about how analysts will react could be inter-
preted as suggestive of a naive view of how the
market operates—see for example the discussion
in CoUinson et al. (1993). Sometimes, however,
there may be more complex linkages between be-
hefs and preferences (O'Keefe and Soloman,
1985). For example, suppose companies preferred
the ASB to choose immediate write-off as the sole
approach and expressed the belief that analysts
consider that the immediate write-off of goodwill
gives UK firms an international competitive ad-
vantage. Such a behef could stem from finance di-
rectors having a naive view of the effects of ac-
counting numbers and how analysts interpret
them, and preferring immediate write-off because
of higher reported profits under that approach. On
the other hand, it could be that they believe that
such competitive advantage arises because of the
differences in profit-based management compen-
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sation in different countries owing to the different
reported profit figures (Lee and Choi, 1992).
We also examine a number of possible other,
information effect (IE)-related, beliefs. We hypoth-
esise a positive association between the preference
for capitalisation-based approaches and finance di-
rectors' beliefs that:
•capitalising goodwill would enable analysts and
other users better to assess their group size relative
to other groups than not doing so;
•analysts would consider the company less risky if
goodwill were capitalised and gearing ratios con-
sequently improved;
•the increased gearing ratios caused by immediate
write-off compared to capitalisation and amortis-
ation has a negative effect on the way that analysts
perceive the company;
•immediate write-off distorts the inferences that
analysts draw in making comparisons between
companies that have grown by acquisition and
those that have grown by internal growth.
We hypothesise a negative association between
the preference for capitalisation-based approaches
where finance directors believed that:
•analysts would downgrade their rating if their
profits were lower due to enforced goodwill amor-
tisation;
•that the widely used UK practice of immediate
write-off to reserves, which results in no profit and
loss account charge, gives UK companies an inter-
national competitive advantage compared to
similar non-UK companies.
4. Sample, data and variables
4.1. Data sources and sample selection
Two main data sources were used for our study:
Extel's Company Research CD-ROM database
and the results of a postal questionnaire survey.
We utilised the former to compile a dataset giving
1994 year-end financial statement information that
enabled the calculation of variables such as gear-
ing levels and interest cover. The survey provided
company data relating to contracting cost hypoth-
eses, such as the existence and nature of debt cov-
enant restrictions and senior management profit-
based compensation contracts. Certain interaction
variables, discussed later, make use of both
sources.
In the survey, we asked for and obtained specific
and detailed information on how goodwill was
explicitly or implicitly treated in contracts—
whether its treatment was based on UK GAAP,
another form of GAAP or a non-GAAP basis, and
for GAAP treatments, whether they were based on
rolling (extant) or frozen (fixed at the time of the
covenant) GAAP. As far as we are aware, this sur-
vey, sent out in December 1994, was the first of
this type to be sent to all large UK hsted com-
panies. This information constitutes the only data
source on the treatment of goodwill in debt cove-
nant restrictions and management compensation
contracts extensive enough for our purposes.
Compared to previous UK studies (e.g.. Citron,
1992a, 1995; Day and Taylor, 1995, 1996), based
on smaller samples, we identified a smaller pro-
portion of companies having non-GAAP goodwill
accounting methods specified in their contracts.
Standard survey design procedures, including
pre-testing, feedback meetings, and a pilot survey
were utilised. To reduce response bias due to lack
of knowledge of the proposals, we sent with the
survey instrument a one-page summary of the
ASB's Discussion Paper on goodwill accounting.
We also asked about prior familiarity with the
proposals and included control questions to check
answer consistency. Our sampling frame com-
prised finance directors of those UK-incorporated
companies within The Times 1000 (1994 edition)
having a stock market listing. Of the 502 such
companies, 21 were used for the pilot study and
481 companies in the main survey. Prima facie
these companies were more likely than others to
be involved in take-over activity and hence have
material levels of goodwill, to have formalised
debt covenants and management compensation
schemes, and to have an active interest in new ac-
counting proposals. The survey instrument was
mailed early in December 1994, with a second re-
quest four weeks later.'*
The overall response rate of 58.4% (281 com-
panies) is high for this type of survey, as is the
usable response rate of 44.1% (212 companies).
Analysis of the 69 unusable responses reveals no
systematic biasing factors: 52% of these stated that
it was company policy not to take part in surveys,
16% did not wish to take part in this particular
survey, 13% cited time pressures, and the remain-
ing 19% comprised a variety of other reasons.
Respondent companies were from a broad spread
of business sectors, as shown in Table 1. A Z-test
showed that in 14 out of the 15 industry categories
there was no significant difference between the
proportion of companies responding and the pro-
portion in the population.
Further, to assess response bias we compared
respondents and non-respondents by industry
grouping, gearing ratio, interest cover ratio, total
assets and turnover. Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-
Whitney tests showed no significant difference be-
tween the two groups. We also compared re-
sponses to first and second mailings using
Chi-squared and Mann-Whitney tests. These
showed that differences in responses between the
groups were in line with what might be expected
by chance. Financial statement characteristics, in
''A copy of the survey instrument is available from the
authors on request.
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Table 1
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terms of quartiles, of respondents and of the sam-
pling frame as a whole are shown in Table 2.
Of individual respondents, 52% were financial
directors, 23% financial controllers and 23% other
accountants or managers: only 2% were compara-
tively junior or undeclared. Results of tests with
and without such junior or undeclared respondents
are very similar: those reported include this last
group. All respondents were either professionally
qualified and/or had an extensive background in
accounting.
We are confident that preferences expressed to
us reflect a corporate rather than a personal view.
The questionnaire objectives made clear that we
sought 'the views and preferences of large com-
panies...'. We deliberately targeted finance direc-
tors and financial controllers so that responses
would reflect appropriate seniority and decision-
making power. Our analysis of respondents illus-
trates that our targeting strategy was successful.
5. The model and variables used
Because of the non-normality of the explanatory
variables and the binary nature of the dependent
variable, PREF, we used logistic regression to
Table 2
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= 1 if company expresses a first preference for the ASB to adopt capitalisation of goodwill,
and = 0 if preference is for immediate write-off.
High gearing dummy = 1 if gearing level > upper quartile gearing of sampling frame
companies. The gearing ratio is calculated from Extel definitions as (Total
borrowings+Preference capital)/(Total borrowings+Preference capital+Ordinary
capital+Reserves+Minorities — Intangibles), winsorised at 100%. The Extel definition uses
the immediate write-off basis for measuring gearing. This is justified in this study on the
assumption that lenders assess the relative tightness of debt covenant restrictions between
companies by using a common UK comparative framework, and only then do they
reformulate such restrictions in terms of the actual goodwill accounting approach used by
the company
High gearing x Restriction. Restriction dummy = 1 if company has gearing-based debt
covenant restriction'
High gearing x Restriction x Rolling GAAP. Rolling GAAP dummy = 1 if company has a
rolling GAAP restriction^
Low Interest cover = 1 if < lower quartile interest cover of sampling frame companies.
Interest cover ratio defined as (Profit before interest and taxation/Interest charge),
winsorised at 50 times
Low Interest cover x Restriction. Restriction dummy = 1 if company has interest cover-
based debt covenant restriction'
Low Interest cover x Restriction x Rolling GAAP. Rolling GAAP dummy = 1 if company
has a rolling GAAP restriction^
= 1 if profit-based management compensation scheme exists'
Profit-based management compensation scheme x Rolling GAAP. Rolling GAAP
dummy = 1 if company compensation scheme has a rolling GAAP restriction^
= 1 if US quote'
= 1 if company needed to consider the implications of London Stock Exchange Class 1
transactions in the previous five years'
= 1 if company is in utilities sector
Natural logarithm of sales
= 1 if company felt that capitalising goodwill would enable analysts and other users better
to assess their group size relative to other groups'
= 1 if company felt that analysts would downgrade their rating if their profits were lower
due to enforced goodwill amortisation'
= 1 if company felt that analysts would consider the company less risky if goodwill were
capitalised and gearing ratios consequently improved'
= 1 if company felt that the UK practice of immediate write-off to reserves, resulting in no
profit and loss account charge, gives UK companies an international competitive advantage
over similar US companies'
= 1 if company felt that the increased gearing ratios caused by immediate write-off
compared to capitalise and amortise has a negative effect on the way that analysts would
perceive the company'
= 1 if company felt that immediate write-off distorts analysts' inferences when making
comparisons between companies that have grown by acquisition and those that have grown
by internal growth'
Eight industry categories based on the London Business School database
'Established by survey question. The information effect variables included an 'unsure' category, which was
included in our tests, but not reported in Table 5 to preserve clarity of presentation.
^We established through the questionnaire that the relevant debt covenant included goodwill in the restriction
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evaluate the validity of our hypotheses, PREF
takes the value of one if management's first pref-
erence is for capitalisation-based approaches (61
respondents) and zero for immediate write-off ap-
proaches (151 respondents),^ Our model contained




+p6 INTCOVI(2)+P7 MC0MP+p8 MCOMPI
+P5 USQ+pio CLl+Pi, UTIL-i-p,2 LOGSALES
+P,3 BSZ+P,4 DRATE+p,5 LRISK-i-
p,6 INTCADV-i-p,, WGEAR+P,8 DCOMP
+1
The variables are described in Table 3, In testing
the contracting cost issues discussed above we use
a model based on categorical variables. In this
model, main effect variables include the existence
of profit-based management compensation plans
(MCOMP); and debt covenant restrictions (for
which we used one type of balance sheet restric-
tion, gearing level (GEAR), which takes the value
one for high-geared firms and zero otherwise, and
one income statement-based restriction, interest-
cover (INTCOV), which takes the value one for
low interest cover firms and zero otherwise); the
presence of a US quote (USQ); the active consider-
ation of Class 1 Transactions (CLl); whether or
not the company is a utility (UTIL); and size
(LOGSALES), The variables used to test the
information effect hypotheses directly relate to the
hypotheses outlined earlier and so are not dis-
cussed further here,*
The earliest studies on contracting costs and ac-
counting choice used only continuous main effect
explanatory variables, such as gearing and interest
cover ratios, to measure the effects of debt cove-
nant restrictions. Such an approximation for
measuring 'binding' restrictions was criticised as
being inexact (Duke and Hunt, 1990; Press and
Weintrop, 1990), Later studies used simple inter-
action effects to refine measurement, by measuring
'The former are alternatives i, ii, and iii in the ASB's 1993
DP, as detailed in footnote 1, and the latter alternatives iv, v
and vi. Alternative specifications were also tested: see Section
6.
'Many of the survey questions upon which our variables are
based allowed responses of 'yes', 'no' or 'unsure'. The 'unsure'
category was included in our tests for information effect vari-
ables. While this reduces the power of the tests somewhat and
therefore makes our results conservative, it avoids artificially
constraining the responses. We only report results for 'yes' ver-
sus 'no' in our tables because reporting the 'unsure' results
would overload with detail an already complicated presenta-
tion, and we do not have formal hypotheses for the compari-
sons with 'unsure'. (As might be expected though, the results
for 'yes' versus 'unsure' were generally in a similar direction to
those for 'yes' versus 'no' but showed less significance.) We did
not include an 'unsure' category for the contracting variables
because to do so would have exponentially increased model
complexity. There were also fewer such answers.
the effects of gearing or interest cover designated
'high' or 'low' relative to medians (e,g, Ayres,
1986; Dunne, 1990), Our study contains further re-
finements: we use quartiles to reflect more plausi-
bly the point at which gearing and interest cover
restrictions become binding, and categorical vari-
ables to challenge the assumption implicit in the
continuous model that the degree of 'bindingness'
(and therefore the consequences of breakage of
debt covenant restrictions) increases in a linear
fashion beyond the upper or lower quartile point.
We argue that it is more reasonable to assume that
debt covenant restrictions only become binding be-
yond a particular point and not before (though we
find similar results, discussed later, when con-
tinuous variables are used). In addition, we focus
on higher level interaction terms to target more
exactly firms having binding restrictions of the rel-
evant type, i,e, based on rolling GAAP (Mohr-
man, 1996),
Our hypotheses and modelling are thus based on
interaction and not main effect terms. For exam-
ple, GEAR, with its coefficient, p,, is the incre-
mental effect in log-odds ratio terms of high-
geared firms over low-geared firms, GEARI(2), the
highest level interaction variable, with coefficient
P3, can be interpreted as the incremental effect of
the simultaneous presence of high gearing and roll-
ing GAAP debt covenant restrictions over merely
the presence of high gearing and debt covenant
restrictions which are not based on rolling GAAP,
Thus, P1+P2+P3 measures the contracting cost ef-
fect for high geared firms with gearing restrictions
based on rolling GAAP, p,+P2 measures the effect
for the remaining highly geared firms with gearing
restrictions, but not based on rolling GAAP, P,
measures the effect for the rest of the firms which
are high geared but do not have gearing debt cov-
enant restrictions. We do not model all possible
main effects and interaction terms, for example
measuring the existence of a debt covenant restric-
tion per se, as we are only interested in incremental
effects relating to gearing.
Our main contracting cost hypotheses relate
only to highest-level interaction terms such as
GEARI(2), where we predict that P3 will be signifi-
cant and positive, i,e, a positive association be-
tween management preference for capitalisation-
based approaches and gearing level for high geared
companies (above the top quartile) where there is
also a rolling-GAAP debt covenant restriction. If
any of these conditions were not met, for example
if GAAP were non-rolling, contracting cost theory
would not predict any particular association. Sim-
ilarly we predict that the coefficient of INT-
C0VI(2) will be negative, i,e, the incremental in-
terest cover effect for companies with binding
interest cover restrictions, having rolling GAAP-
based interest cover restrictions and with interest
cover below the bottom quartile. We also hypoth-
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esise that only where there are rolling GAAP-
based profit-based management compensation
plans will this influence management preferences,
so we predict that Pg the regression coefficient of
MCOMPI, will be negative.
Our use of non-interaction (GEAR, INTCOV
and MCOMP) and lower level interaction varia-
bles (e.g. GEAR (1)) is merely to proxy for omit-
ted variables. We also use industry to control for
omitted variables correlated with industry effects,
e.g. capital intensity and differential financing
regimes.
A correlation matrix for the main effect varia-
bles is shown in Table 4. A number of significant
correlations are apparent but the following points
may be made. The correlation between interest
cover and gearing level is dealt with in our sensi-
tivity analyses where we fit models with each in-
dividually. As might be expected, industry classi-
fication (which includes utilities) is correlated with
two contracting cost variables. This may lead to
some understatement of the strength of our results,
and thus they should be seen as conservative.
LOGSALES is correlated with our transaction
cost variables. We hypothesise that they operate in
the same direction, and so would not expect the
effect of each to mask the others. We specifically
address correlations between contracting cost and
information effect variables by also fitting separate
models for each category of variables (see Section
6). The correlation between some of the informa-
tion effect variables is significant, but this does not
prevent many of these variables proving individ-
ually significant in the tests reported later, though
the level of significance of individual variables may
therefore again be understated.
6. Results
The main results are shown in Table 5. The model
has very good overall explanatory power as shown
by its log-likelihood ratio (model chi-square),
overall fit and goodness-of-fit statistic. Individual
variables act generally in the directions hypothes-
ised and a number of them are highly significant.
Results for individual variables provide con-
siderable support for contracting-cost effects.
Binding highest level interaction gearing and
management compensation contracting effects are
in the directions hypothesised, GEARI(2) being
positive and MCOMPI negative, and are highly
significant. The binding interest cover contracting
effect, INTCOVI(2) is not significant, although its
sign is as predicted. Other, non-agency, contract-
ing variables are of the hypothesised sign, except
the consideration of Class 1 transactions, CLl,
which has the opposite sign to that predicted, but
none are significant.' Certain control variables are
significant (INTCOV) or marginally significant
(INTCOVI(l) and MCOMP).
Four IE variables are also significant at the 5%
level or better, and five have the predicted sign.
BSZ, the belief that capitalisation and amortisa-
tion would enable analysts better to assess the size
of the company, is very highly significant. Signifi-
cant at the 5% level are DRATE, the belief that
capitalisation and amortisation leads to analysts
down-rating the company, INTCADV, the belief
that the practice of immediate write-off to reserves
gives UK companies an international competitive
advantage, and DCOMP, the belief that the
method of goodwill accounting distorts compari-
sons between companies that have grown by
acquisition and those which have grown by inter-
nal means.
Sensitivity analysis included fitting a model
where gearing and interest cover levels were
measured as continuous variables consistent, as
discussed earlier, with previous studies: other
sensitivity analyses on the model were conducted
as follows:
i) Measuring the tightness of debt covenant re-
strictions both in terms of population medians and
industry quartiles.*
ii) Fitting models with debt covenant restrictions
based on gearing variables only, and then with in-
terest cover variables only.
iii) Fitting models based on contracting varia-
bles only and information effect variables only, for
each of the sensitivity runs in i) and ii).
v) Restricting contracting and information effect
only models to the same cases as the main model.
iv) Remeasuring the dependent variable PREF
using different groupings of the six goodwill ac-
counting alternatives given in the ASB's 1993 DP.'
'One reviewer has pointed out that our results for the US-
quote variable, USQ, may have been contaminated to a certain
extent by our survey questions not distinguishing between a full
US quotation and where company securities are traded as
American Depository Receipts. With hindsight it would have
been better to distinguish these. We address this ambiguity by
instead re-running the model using a variable based on another
survey question, whether the company produces a reconcilia-
tion to US GAAP, such as the SEC form 20-F. This use of the
redefined variable produces a similar result to that reported,
indicating that not distinguishing between the two types of US
listing is unlikely to have affected the results.
^This was to capture any tendency for lenders to set the val-
ues of individual covenants to industry levels (even though they
would also recognise individual company circumstances as
well). This also addresses industry-specific accounting effects.
'The six alternatives are given in footnote 1. Differentiating
capitalisation (alternatives i, ii and iii) and immediate write-off
approaches (alternatives iv, v and vi), as in our main tests, is
undeniably best for capturing balance sheet effects. It also cap-
tures income statement effects to a large extent, since alterna-
tives i, ii and iii all have income statement effects. However,
case vi also has some income statement effect. Therefore the
second specification used differentiated alternatives i, ii, iii and
vi from alternatives iv and v (which have no income statement
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Results of logistic regression of company preference for desired ASB goodwill treatment
0 = immediate write-ofQ against contracting
Model:
PREE = Po+P, GEAR+P2 GEARI(1)+P3 G
and information effect variables
EARI(2)-i-P4 INTCOV+P5 INTCOVI(1)+P,
P, MCOMP+Ps MCOMPI-l-p, USQ+P,o CLl+P,, UTIL+p,j LOGSALES+pp BSZ+P
Pi, INTCADV+P,, WGEAR-hp.g DCOMP+Z P, IND;



























Figures provided for each variable are the
**significant at 5% level, ***significant at



















































regression coefficient and the p value (*significant at 10% level.
1% level). Where hypothesised coefficient signs are given, the p
one-tailed test: otherwise tests are two-tailed.
Variations in the results of the analyses are
greatly outweighed by their cotnmon features. The
effect of measuring gearing and interest cover as
continuous variables hardly changes the overall
model fit. Contracting cost effects in this model are
very similar to the main model, except that the
management compensation variable is significant
at the 5% rather than the 1% level. IE effect var-
iables in the continuous model are more highly
significant than contracting cost variables.
In nearly all the sensitivity analyses the binding
rolling GAAP gearing restriction variable is highly
effect). An even better specification of major income statement
effects might have been to differentiate alternatives ii and iii
from the rest, but the smaller number of cases in these cate-
gories results in a loss of test power. To the extent that there
is any mis-specification, our results for variables defined in in-
come statement terms will be too conservative.
significant in the hypothesised direction, while the
binding rolling GAAP management compensation
variable has the predicted sign in all sensitivity
tests and is significant at the 5% level in the great
majority of runs. The binding rolling GAAP in-
terest cover variable is rarely significant. Although
as expected, the explanatory power of the median-
based model is lower, it is one of only two to in-
dicate any statistical significance for this variable.
It also shows lower significance for some informa-
tion effect variables, but BSZ retains its pre-emi-
nence. In the industry-based quartile model, the
binding rolling GAAP gearing restriction variable
is less significant than in all the other runs.
When interest cover variables are run without
gearing variables, the model %^ falls, which con-
firms our impression that management preferences
were not greatly driven by interest cover contract-
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ing cost variables. Whether a company is in the
utilities sector is generally not significant, giving
only very weak support to the political costs hypo-
thesis. Contracting cost-only models have less ex-
planatory power than information effects only
models, and tend not to have a significant fit,
whereas the latter are all highly significant. Shifts
in coefficients between partial models and the main
model suggest, as might be expected, omitted
variables.
Restricting the overall models to the same cases
produces no major changes. Changing the defini-
tional groupings for the dependent variable results
in lower significance for the binding rolling GAAP
gearing variable and higher significance for the
rolling GAAP management compensation vari-
able, as might be expected, while the main
information effect variables continued to be
significant.
The overall results of the sensitivity analysis
therefore suggest a high level of robustness of the
model to alternative specifications.
7. Summary and conclusions
Our study examines empirically factors infiuencing
UK corporate managements' preferences for
goodwill accounting. In so doing, it utilises the
window of opportunity that arose in 1994 when
the UK Accounting Standards Board was unde-
cided on the issue and was canvassing constituents
on how it should proceed towards the develop-
ment of a standard. The study is novel in that it
combines financial data derived from a commer-
cial database with survey data to specify contract-
ing cost hypotheses more precisely than in previ-
ous studies. We use interaction variables more
exactly to specify binding factors likely to influ-
ence management. Our study is also novel in ex-
amining non-contracting factors refiecting
management's beliefs about market perceptions of
their companies.
Our results indicate that management's prefer-
ences for accounting for goodwill were influenced
by factors consistent with a contracting cost
framework. Both binding gearing-based debt cov-
enant restrictions and profit-based management
compensation schemes were found to be significant
in the direction hypothesised, but interest cover-
based covenant restrictions much less so.
In addition, our results show that corporate
managements' goodwill accounting preferences are
also influenced to a great extent by their beliefs
about how the stock market (represented by finan-
cial analysts) would respond to the financial state-
ment impact of changes in standards. The most
significant IE variables relate to management's be-
lief that capitalisation of goodwill would allow an-
alysts better to assess the size of their company;
that analysts would downgrade their rating if their
company's profits were lower due to enforced
goodwill amortisation; that immediate write-off
methods gives UK companies an advantage in
international take-over contests; and that imme-
diate write-off causes difficulties for analysts when
compairing companies that grew organically and
those that grew by acquisition. However, the im-
pacts of these last three are not as strong as that
relating to beliefs about the assessment of size.
This particular variable could be interpreted in a
number of ways:
• in terms of managements having 'omitted asset'
concerns, believing that the absence of goodwill
from their balance sheet gives a false view of the
company and possibly that it is 'better' accounting
to include it;
• in functional fixation terms, that management
wished the company to be seen as a larger com-
pany; or
• in 'market' terms, that management intuited
what has been found in US empirical studies (see
footnote 2) that there is correlation between re-
ported balance sheet goodwill and market values.
Overall, our sensitivity analyses indicate that our
results are robust to differing model specifications.
Two of the novel features of our study are show-
ing the importance of utilising high-level interac-
tion terms in modelling contracting cost variables,
and of defining bindingness more rigorously, e.g.
using quartiles rather than medians. We feel that
a similar approach could also usefully be applied
to similar empirical studies in other areas of ac-
counting. Further research is needed on a number
of issues: into modelling more explicitly the costs
of covenant breaches, the relative magnitudes of
different types of contracting costs, and on gaining
a better understanding of the sources and develop-
ment of management beliefs.
Our work also has policy implications. It indi-
cates that the ASB needs to take account of pot-
ential contracting costs imposed on companies by
changes in accounting standards. The Board
should also be sensitive to managements' concerns
about how such changes will affect the way that
the market perceives their companies. Failure suf-
ficiently to appreciate the perceived importance of
both issues may result in unwelcome adverse re-
action to proposed changes and lobbying against
them. The factors we find driving preparers' think-
ing are relevant as a starting point for its deliber-
ations on future accounting issues.
In arriving at these conclusions, the usual ca-
veats about using survey data should be noted,
though such an approach was the only way to col-
lect iniportant non-publicly available data.
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